Common spaces and the urban order of the 'city of enclaves'

The city must be controlled and shaped by dominant power relations if it is to remain a crucial means for society’s reproduction. But the city is not simply the result of spatiotemporal ordering in the same way that society is not simply the result of social ordering. Order, social or urban, is a project rather than an accomplished state. Therefore it is important that we locate the mechanisms through which the project of urban ordering is being shaped and implemented if we want to discover the forces that resist or overturn this ordering. Ordering mechanisms do not simply execute certain programmed functions but constitute complicated, self-regulating systems that interact with urban reality and ‘learn’ from their mistakes. Urban ordering, the metropolis itself, is a process, a stake, much in the same way that dominant social relations need to be reproduced every day.

Urban order is the impossible limit towards which practices of spatial classification and hierarchisation tend in order to ensure that the city produces those spatial relations that are necessary for capitalism’s reproduction. Ordering mechanisms are not only meant to tame a complicated and highly differentiated form of human *habitat* (perhaps the most complicated one in human history so far), they are also, to use Foucault’s bold term, ‘mechanisms of social normalisation’. Foucault insists that normalisation is not simply the result of the legal system: ‘techniques of normalization develop from and below a system of law, in its margins and may be even against it’.¹

In terms of urban ordering, normalisation includes attempts to establish spatial relations that encourage social relations and forms of behaviour, which are meant to be repeatable, predictable and compatible with the taxonomy of the necessary social roles. Normalisation shapes human behaviour and may use space (as well as other means) to do so.

Normalisation is a project and also a stake. It is not simply imposed on populations; it has to infiltrate every capillary of society in order to be effective. It has to be connected to words and acts that mould everydayness, but also to acts of dominant power that frame those everyday molecular practices. Normalisation is undoubtedly a project of domination, a project that seeks to mould society’s subjects, and thus it has to be the result of a certain arrangement of power relations.

Before the current economic crisis, the governing elites thought they had reached the capitalist heaven, where money magically begets money.² They imagined that they could at last do away with the obstacles to profit that labour creates. As the economic ‘bubbles’ burst, the importance of mechanisms that bind people to dominant policies once again became evident. It is these policies that currently shape the normalisation project through their focus on two important targets. The first of
these is to ensure that social bonds continue to treat individuals as economic subjects, as subjects whose behaviour and motives can be analysed, channelled, predicted and, ultimately, controlled by the use of economic parameters and measures alone. The second is to ensure that people continue to act and dream without participating in any form of connectedness or coordination with others that does not contribute to the creation of profit.

Both targets are strongly connected to the hegemonic shaping of the contemporary metropolis. It is the control of this urban environment that aims to preserve our society’s precarious balance by ensuring that people continue to act as selfish and obedient individuals. The powerful live and work in fortified citadels. The rest are offered either the doubtful security of enclosed spaces of consumption and living, or are forced to work and spend their lives in areas circumscribed by sanitised urban zones. Urban ordering is therefore oriented towards the expansive urbanity of a ‘city of enclaves’. Urban enclaves tend to be self-contained worlds in which specific forms of spatial ordering prevail. Ordering is guaranteed by rules that apply only inside each enclave. A peculiar, site-specific sovereign power is thus established in urban enclaves in the form of an administrative apparatus that imposes obligations and patterns of behaviour, and therefore defines the characteristics of the enclave’s inhabitants.

Specific rules are applied in the ordering of a large department store, in the way one enters a bank or a corporate tower, and in the layout and use of a shopping mall or a huge sports stadium. Urban islands may be huge building complexes, like the ones described above, but also whole neighbourhoods, as in the case of so-called ‘gated communities’. Spatial ordering is connected with behaviour normalisation in all cases. Normalisation is explicitly or implicitly performed through the enforcement of regulations, which often present themselves as purely innocent management decisions. The contemporary metropolis is ‘an archipelago of “normalized enclosures”’.4

Immersed in their everyday, enclave-defined lives, people tend to accept each enclave’s rules of use as an indisputable normality. They even understand these rules of use as the functional decrees of well-intentioned authorities. They abandon themselves to the promises of those rules, which guarantee what law is supposed to guarantee: protection. People learn to abandon their rights in exchange for this protection. And, of course, protection (from whatever the authorities present to people as a threat) is the deepest and most consistent alibi used to make rules seem ‘natural’.5

Yet urban ordering and the corresponding normalisation policies do not go unchallenged. Actually, a widespread – albeit latent – loss of faith in this society’s promises has triggered various forms of disobedience and resistance. Normalisation remains a contested and precarious project in a period of crisis with no apparent way out. Emergent new forms of resistance are importantly connected to acts that shape urban space in order to create new social bonds and build forms of collective struggle and survival.

Practices of this kind lead to collective experiences that reclaim the city as a potentially liberating environment and reshape crucial questions that characterise emancipatory politics. In this context, the city becomes not only the setting but also the means to collectively experiment with possible alternative forms of social organisation. Moreover, the sharing of space becomes a crucially important stake, both as a means of experimenting and as one of the goals of such experiments.

Common spaces are those spaces produced by people in their effort to establish a common world that houses, supports and expresses the community they participate in. Therefore, common spaces
should be distinguished from both public spaces and private ones. Public spaces are primarily created by a specific authority (local, regional or state), which controls them and establishes the rules under which people may use them. Private spaces belong to and are controlled by specific individuals or economic entities that have the right to establish the conditions under which others may use them.

David Harvey offers a dense synopsis of the discussion concerning the nature of commons in general and common space in particular. He insists that the common is not ‘a particular kind of thing’ but ‘an unstable and malleable social relation between a particular self-defined social group and those aspects of its actually existing or yet-to-be-created social and/or physical environment deemed crucial to its life and livelihood’. Thus common space can be considered as a relation between a social group and its effort to define a world that is shared by its members. By its very conception, such a world can be stable and well defined, completely separate from what is kept outside and from ‘outsiders’. This is indeed the kind of world that can be contained in an urban enclave: enclaves can be secluded common worlds, as in the case of a favela, or a gated community.

However, common space can also be a porous world, always in the making, if we consider the relation that defines it as dynamic, both in terms of the formation of its corresponding group or community and the characteristics of the common world itself. Jacques Rancière revealingly re-theorises community through the notion of ‘common world’. This world, according to him, is more than a ‘shared ethos’ and a ‘shared adobe’. It ‘is always a polemical distribution of modes of being and “occupations” in a space of possibilities’.

Consequently, common space may be shaped through the practices of an emerging and not necessarily homogeneous community that does not simply try to secure its reproduction but also attempts to enrich its exchanges with other communities as well as those between its members. Common space may take the form of a meeting ground, an area in which ‘expansive circuits of encounter’ intersect. Through acts of establishing common spaces, the discrimination and barriers that characterise the enclave urbanity may be countered.

In the prospect of re-appropriating the city, common spaces are the spatial nodes through which the metropolis once again becomes the site of politics, if by politics we mean an open process through which the dominant forms of living together are questioned and potentially transformed. The following is a description of the collective experience of re-appropriating the metropolis by a group that almost ignited Gezi Park occupation in Istanbul, Turkey, in their struggle to defend a park that was to be destroyed by the government’s plans. ‘The struggle for Gezi Park and Taksim Square set a new definition of what public space means. Reclaiming Taksim has shattered AKP’s [governing party] hegemony in deciding what a square is supposed to mean for us citizens, because Taksim is now what the Resistance wants it to mean: our public square.’ Interestingly, the group’s name translates as ‘Our Commons’.

The prevailing experiences of urban enclosures, and the dominant vision of recognisable, identity-imposing enclaves, colonise the thought and actions of those who attempt to reclaim politics. We need to abandon a view that fantasises about uncontaminated enclaves of emancipation. Threshold experience and the threshold metaphor offer a counter-example to the dominant enclave city. Rather than perpetuating an image of such a city as an archipelago of enclave-islands, we need to create spaces that inventively threaten this peculiar urban order by overturning dominant taxonomies of spaces and life types. Spaces-as-thresholds acquire a dubious, perhaps precarious,
but also virus-like existence: they become active catalysts in processes of re-appropriating the city as commons.

Thresholds may appear to be mere boundaries that separate an inside from an outside, as in a door's threshold, but this act of separation is always and simultaneously an act of connection. Thresholds create the conditions of entrance and exit; thresholds prolong, manipulate and give meaning to an act of passage. This is why thresholds have been marked in many societies by rituals that attempt to control the inherent potentialities of crossing. Guardian gods or spirits dwell at thresholds because the act of passage is already an act that creates a potential connection between an inside and an outside. Entering may be taken as an intrusion, and exiting may convey the stigma of ostracism.

Thresholds acquire symbolic meaning and are often shaped in ways that express and corrobore this meaning. Societies construct thresholds as spatial artifices that regulate, symbolically and actually, practices of crossing, practices of bridging different worlds. And these practices may be socially beneficial or harmful. Societies also use the image and the emblematic experience of thresholds to metaphorically ascribe meaning to changes of social status that periodically and necessarily happen to their members. Passing from childhood to adolescence, from single to married life, from life to death, from apprenticeship to the status of the professional, from trainee to warrior, and so on, are cases of supervised social transformations that mould individuals. Societies often understand these changes as the crossing of thresholds: initiation procedures guarantee a socially ‘safe’ crossing by directing neophytes to the ‘other’ side.\(^\text{12}\)

As the anthropologist Victor Turner has observed, threshold crossing contains an inherent transforming potential that is not necessarily bound to the rules of social reproduction. People on the threshold experience the potentiality of change because during the period of their stay on the threshold a peculiar experience occurs, the experience of ‘\textit{communitas}'.\(^\text{13}\) People who have lost their previous social identity but have not yet acquired a new one linger on the threshold of change ‘betwixt and between’, almost reduced to the common characteristics shared by all humans.\(^\text{14}\) Social differentiation may appear quite arbitrary during such an experience. A kind of equalising potentiality seems to dwell on thresholds. Liminality, the spatiotemporal quality of threshold experience, is a condition that gives people the opportunity to share a common world-in-the-making, in which differences appear as pre-social or even anti-social.\(^\text{15}\)

Initiation threshold spaces are defined through the ritual practices that bring them into existence. Such threshold spaces are under society’s surveillance and any form of ‘\textit{communitas}’ is carefully limited to an ephemeral initiatory existence. However, in thresholds that give space to and shape institutions of expanding commoning, ‘\textit{communitas}’ is experienced as an always-in-the-making community of participating commoners. Rather than experiencing the potentialities of equality by being ritually reduced to a common zero degree of humanness (as do the initiated in rites of passage), through their acts the people involved construct a community of equals because they choose to define at least part of their life autonomously and in common. Emergent communities of creators and users of city space: is this not a prospect that would transform city space into common space, into space-as-commons?

For commoning to remain a force that produces forms of cooperation through sharing, it has to be a process that oversteps the boundaries of any established community, even if this community aspires to be an egalitarian and anti-authoritarian one. Emerging subjects of commoning actions transform themselves by always being open to ‘newcomers’...
In defence. Spatial porosity, however, was restored every time people were left to develop their inventive and spreading miniature cities: micro-squares within a reclaimed public square.¹⁷

Institutions of expanding commoning?
This is where the problem of the ‘institutions of commoning’ arises.¹⁸ By its very constitution as a tool of social organisation, an institution tends to circumscribe a community as a closed world of predictable and repeatable social practices. Thus, institutions of commoning may also be employed to define specific commoning practices, and the corresponding community of commoners be considered as a closed, self-reproducing world. But this may – and often does – lead to forms of enclosure.¹⁹

For commoning practices to become important pre-figurations of an emancipated society, commoning has to remain a collective struggle to re-appropriate and transform a society’s common wealth by continually expanding the network of sharing and collaboration.²⁰ Although collective experiences such as those of Syntagma Square’s self-managed tent city (one of the many instances of the recent occupied squares movement that includes the European ‘indignant citizens’, the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement) may represent an inspiring example of a culture based on equality, solidarity and collective inventiveness, the exemplary power of the corresponding common spaces persists only when they remain ‘infectious’, osmotic and capable of extending egalitarian values and practices outside their boundaries. Central squares became important for the recent occupy movements because they had the capacity to become crucial nodes in a developing network of neighbourhoods and cities. It was police attacks and authoritarian government policies that tried to limit the metastatic character of those common spaces by forcing the occupiers to barricade themselves in defence. Spatial porosity, however, was restored every time people were left to develop their inventive and spreading miniature cities: micro-squares within a reclaimed public square.²¹

Dominant institutions legitimise inequality, distinguishing between those who know and those who do not, between those who can take decisions and those who must execute them, between those who have specific rights and those who are deprived of them. Thus, dominant institutions that focus on the production and uses of public space are essentially forms of authorisation that stem from certain authorities and aim at directing the behaviour of public space users.²²

It is undeniable that there also exist dominant institutions that seem to be grounded in an abstract equality: real people with differentiated characteristics, needs and dreams are reduced to neutralised subjects with abstract rights. Thus, in public space, general rules apply to homogenised users, ones who can have access to a specific place at specific hours of the day and under specific conditions (including the use of discreet or conspicuous surveillance).

In spite of their different roles in social normalisation, both types of dominant institutions classify and predict types of behaviour and deal with only those differences that are fixed and perpetuated through the classifications they establish. There are obviously differences in terms of content: an institution that aims at guaranteeing a certain form of equality (no matter how abstract) is different from an institution that openly imposes discrimination.

Institutions of expanding commoning explicitly differ from dominant institutions (institutions of domination) as well as from those institutions which articulate practices ‘enclosed’ commoning. This makes them potentially different ‘social artifices’, which are oriented towards creating different social bonds.
Three essential qualities characterise institutions of expanding commoning. Firstly, institutions of this kind establish the basis of comparisons between different subjects of action and also between different practices. Subjects of action and practices themselves become comparable and relevant: what is at stake is to invent forms of collaboration based not on homogenisation but on multiplicity. Instead of maintaining or creating distances between different subjects and practices (within a rigid taxonomy), institutions of this kind encourage differences to meet, to mutually expose themselves, and to create grounds of mutual awareness. Mere coexistence does not capture the potentiality of comparison. Differences mean something because they can be compared. Differences are relative and relational.

Let us consider an example: in the case of the occupied Navarinou Park in Athens (a parking lot converted into a lively urban square and garden through a neighbourhood initiative), people could have created distinct working groups with participation based on each one’s knowledge and abilities. This, however, would latently reproduce a role taxonomy derived from the ‘innocent obviousness’ of existing differences. As a young architect who participated in the park’s assembly recalls: ‘People involved felt that they had to reposition themselves outside of their normal position and profession.’ Even in her areas of expertise, she was careful to express her opinion ‘as one opinion among others, and not as the expert’s opinion.’ What makes Navarinou Park an experiment in common space creation is that any form of work and cooperation is implicitly or explicitly an act of collective self-regulation and self-management. Collecting garbage can become a test in such a prospect, as can also be a discussion regarding direct democracy in the park’s assembly. The rules established by the assembly formed institutions of commoning, as did the rules that established a rotation of duties (as in the collection of garbage). Institutions of expanding commoning need to be flexible because ‘newcomers’ need to be included in them without being forced to enter a pre-existing taxonomy of roles. Comparability is the motor force of expanding commoning.

However, comparability is not enough. Institutions of commoning need to offer opportunities as well as tools for translating differences between views, between actions and between subjectivities. If comparability is based on the necessary and constitutive recognition of differences, translatability creates the ground for negotiations between differences without reducing them to common denominators. ‘An emancipated community is a community of narrators and translators.’ Obviously, this is quite difficult since dominant taxonomies tend to block the processes of establishing any socially recognisable common ground that is not based on the predominance of the ruling elites. Translation seeks correspondences, but it cannot and does not aspire to establish an absolute, unobstructed mirroring of one language with another. An institution does – or should do – the same, thus keeping alive the expanding potentiality of commoning. Indeed, ‘the common is always organized in translation.’ Expanding commoning does not expand according to pre-existing patterns; it literally invents itself. Translation is this inherent inventiveness of commoning, which constantly opens new fields and new opportunities for the creation of a common world always-in-the-making.

Another example from Navarinou Park that may seem trivial, but which is not, concerns schoolchildren from the nearby public elementary school, who were invited to participate in the activities of the park yet were not treated as simply potential users of the park. They were encouraged to leave their mark on the park by planting their own small garden, by participating in the construction of colourful benches with broken ceramic tiles, and by organising their own small events in the self-constructed
outdoor theatre. What passes unnoticed in these experiments is that inviting schoolchildren (or any newcomer) to get involved poses problems of translation. What do children discover, express or ask for by participating? How can their aspirations be dealt with without simply using them as fuel for the initiative’s engine?

A third characteristic of institutions of expanding commoning has very deep roots in the history of human societies. Social anthropologists have thoroughly documented the existence of mechanisms in certain societies that prevent or discourage the accumulation of power. Depending on the case, these mechanisms are focused on the equal distribution of collected food, the ritual destruction of wealth, the symbolic sacrifice of leaders, carnivalistic role reversals, etc.

If institutions of commoning are meant to be able to support a constant opening of the circles of commoning, they need to sustain mechanisms of control over any potential accumulation of power, either by individuals or by specific groups. If sharing is to be the guiding principle of self-management practices, then the sharing of power is simultaneously the precondition for egalitarian sharing and its ultimate target. Egalitarian sharing, which needs to be able to include newcomers, has to be encouraged by an ever-expanding network of self-governance institutions. Such institutions can really be ‘open’ and ‘perpetually in flux’, but in very specific ways connected to the practices of expanding commoning. Power is first and foremost the power to decide. If, however, the power to decide is distributed equally through mechanisms of participation, then this power ceases to give certain people the opportunity (whether legitimised or not) to impose their will on others.

Raúl Zibechi has carefully studied the mechanisms used by the struggling communities in El Alto, Bolivia, observing how specific communities chose to ‘disperse power’ rather than build institutions that reproduce centres of power accumulation. He describes how a continuous dialectic between centralised, open assembly decisions and dispersed initiatives of action by smaller groups keeps a struggling community alive, inventive and open to the contribution of each and everyone. Although he chooses to see these practices as non-institutional or non-institutionalised, a wider interpretation of institutions, such as the one employed so far in this text, may consider the practices of El Alto’s ‘commoners’ as open institutions of commoning explicitly targeted at the elimination of institutionalised power centres. We could even transform his remark on communities-in-the-making to a bold definition of institutions of expanding commoning. He says: ‘Community does not merely exist, it is made. It is not an institution, not even an organization, but a way to make links between people.’ Perhaps it is institutions of expanding commoning that make egalitarian links between people, thus producing an open community.

In the recent Occupy movement, as well as in many other forms of direct democracy that were tested in neighbourhood initiatives, an open assembly explicitly tried to establish equality in terms of decision-making. Everyone had the right to participate. In many cases, decision-making was not based on voting but on consensus reached through extended, and sometimes exhaustive, debate. To establish equality of opinions is a difficult process. It depends on who is willing to participate, the importance of the decision, how decisions are linked to specific tasks, and who chooses to assume the burden. Moreover, a further important issue is how a person forms an opinion. How is this influenced by access to knowledge, education and experience? What role do physical abilities play? Frequently, perceived advantages in all these areas latently legitimise certain opinions as superior to others. How does one treat the opinion of somebody who rarely participates in the everyday hard work of
maintaining a common space? And do those who participate more frequently have the right to decide against the opinions of others?

The main argument put forward for accepting forms of concentrated power by participants involved in a movement is efficiency. Quick and coherent decisions, they say, need to be taken by representatives, who, of course, should be elected democratically. Yet the experience of the Squares movement has shown that an obstinate insistence on direct democracy can also create coherent decisions (decisions that do not constantly change the targets or the framework) and an efficient distribution of collectively agreed upon tasks. The Spanish 15M movement, for example, was organised on the basis of daily open assemblies that voted on proposals formulated by thematic commissions, which had titles such as ‘power’, ‘action’, ‘coordination’, ‘logistics’, and so on. Comparability and translation form potential links between strangers and therefore create possibilities for exchanges between them. Egalitarian sharing can support a continually expanding network of exchanges that is open to newcomers. What these three characteristics of emergent, open institutions of commoning establish is forms of sharing that defy enclosure and consider equality both as a presupposition for collaboration and a promise for a just society.

Zapatista autonomous municipalities and Juntas de Buen Gobierno offer a relevant, very interesting and inspiring example. As is well known, Zapatistas never chose to base their emancipating struggle on indigenous Maya fundamentalism. They chose neither to accept the reality of self-referential traditional societies excluded from Mexican civil society, nor to struggle for an independent Maya state. For Zapatistas, autonomy meant self-governance of Zapatista communities and the creation of a second level of autonomous institutions, which would interconnect and coordinate community decisions and activities through the Juntas de Buen Gobierno. Zapatistas attempt to limit the possibilities of an accumulation of power to community representatives by insisting on a rotation in ‘government’ duties (with very short rotation cycles). This may limit efficiency, if efficiency is measured by managerial standards, but it effectively educates all the people in community self-governance.

There is perhaps one more social relation that expands and also transforms egalitarian sharing: the gift. Most anthropological approaches demonstrate that gift exchanges are based on explicit or latent obligations that enforce (or euphemise) asymmetries of power. There can be, however, forms of offering that essentially transgress self- or group-centred calculations and possibly hint towards different forms of togetherness and solidarity. In conditions of harsh inequality (including differentiated access to knowledge and poorly developed individual abilities due to class barriers), commoners of expanding commoning should realise that they often need to offer more than they expect to receive, to speak less and hear more from those who are not privileged speakers, and to contribute to common tasks without demanding an equivalence among the individual offers.

Protest camps in many parts of the world were actually sites of commoning practices that encouraged the giving of gifts. In the occupied Tahrir Square in Cairo, for example, offering food was part of a process that extended socially important habits of hospitality, usually connecting the realm of
to invent forms of life in order to survive. To help release the power of doing that capitalism continuously captures and traps in its mechanisms, we need to participate in the creation of spaces and institutions of expanding commoning. If autonomy has any meaning as an anti-capitalist venture, then it must be constructed in, against and beyond the metropolis by overturning the dominant taxonomies of urban spaces as well as the dominant taxonomies of political actions.

Notes
This paper includes reworked parts of the following texts to be published in Spanish:

Stavros Stavrides (forthcoming), 'Creating Common Space: Occupied Navarinou Park in Athens as an Experiment in Autonomy', in De la Comuna a las Autonomías. Historias de Libertad y Autodeterminación (Mexico City: Bajo Tierra Ediciones).

Stavros Stavrides (forthcoming), 'Normalization and Exception in the Contemporary Metropolis', in Neoliberal Urban Policies Reader (Madrid: Observatorio Metropolitano and Traficantes de Sueños).


6. David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to The Urban Revolution (London: Verso, 2012), p. 73.
9. Müştereklerimiz, ‘Today We Are All Someone New’ (2013), <http://www.opendemocracy.net/m%C3%BC%C5%9Ftereklerimiz/today-we-are-all-someone-new> [accessed 10 June 2014].
11. Stavros Stavrides, Towards the City of Thresholds (Trento: Professional Dreamers, 2010).
17. Ibid., p. 92.
25. Ibid.
32. Stavros Stavrides, Towards the City of Thresholds, p. 121.
33. Ibid., pp. 126-7.


**Biography**

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